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In 2001, the intentional release of anthrax spores in the eastern United States increased concern about
exposure to anthrax nationwide, and residents of Idaho sought assistance. Response from state and local
agencies was required, increasing the strain on epidemiologists, laboratorians, and communications per-
sonnel. In late 2001, Idaho’s public health communications system handled 133 calls about suspicious
powders. For each call, a multiagency bridge call was established, and participants (public health officials,
epidemiologists, police, Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel, hazardous materials officials, and
others) determined which samples would be tested by the state public health laboratory. A triage system
for calls helped relieve the burden on public safety and health systems.
fter the intentional spread of anthrax spores in 2001,
states without anthrax cases were nonetheless affected by
the outbreak. Idaho recorded a sharp rise in emergency calls,
and the response requirements for traditional first responders,
public health officials, laboratorians, and communications per-
sonnel increased. Before the outbreak, public health officials
and first responders had little experience in jointly managing
health-related issues. New response protocols and functional
interagency relationships needed to be developed rapidly.
Responders were faced with new scenarios and an increased
call volume. In addition, safe handling protocols were needed
for managing potential anthrax cases and handling clinical
samples. The response and distribution of timely, accurate
information between local, state, and federal public health
partners, first responders, the health-care community, and the
general public were crucial. Through this experience, proce-
dures have been streamlined for a more effective response.
Notification and Initial Response
to Possible Anthrax Exposures
Anecdotal information suggests that all states had to
respond to public inquiries about powdery substances found in
the mail or public areas. Despite being removed geographi-
cally from anthrax cases and contaminated sites, Idaho was no
exception. The state uses a centralized State Emergency Medi-
cal Services Communications Center (StateComm), which
receives emergency calls in areas that lack 911 services and
provides the emergency communication system for and
between all state agencies. This center was established in 1974
through a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant to enhance
rural Emergency Management System communications ser-
vices but has expanded over the last 10 years to include public
health inquiries. StateComm, which is part of the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare, operates 22 remote moun-
taintop transmitter sites connected by microwave links to a
central location. StateComm staff dispatch regional hazardous
materials (hazmat) teams, page public health officials, and
provide bridge call services; up to 48 ports are available for a
single bridge call. 
From August 1 to October 7, 2001, StateComm received 73
routine hazmat calls and no biohazard calls, which was a typi-
cal calling pattern for the hotline (Figure). However, from
October 8 to December 31, 2001, StateComm received 53 rou-
tine hazmat calls and 133 biohazard calls; all biohazard calls
were related to suspicious powders. Most of the biohazard calls
were made by local law enforcement, who were on-scene inci-
dent commanders following state hazmat response protocols
during powder investigations. StateComm staff then convened
emergency bridge calls for each biohazard call and used state
hazmat protocols to determine who should participate in the
call. Public health, law enforcement (including Federal Bureau
of Investigation [FBI]), hazmat, and other officials routinely
participated in these calls and discussed how to respond to pos-
sible anthrax exposures. All powder-related incidents were
treated as potential criminal acts, and all samples were main-
tained as evidence to ensure a standardized response. For each
call, participants asked the incident commander if a written
threat was present and who was the apparent target. If an
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Figure. Calls received by the Idaho State Communications Center from
August 1, 2001 to December 31, 2001, are shown by category: routine
hazardous materials calls and biohazard (suspicious powder calls).BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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envelope or package had a return address, the on-scene incident
commander contacted the sender to verify that he or she sent
the item and to identify its contents. The threat level was then
assessed based on suspicious package guidelines (1) and other
requirements listed previously. 
During the first days of calls, emergency bridge call partic-
ipants agreed that no samples would be sent to the state public
health laboratory for testing until approved by call partici-
pants. The state public health laboratory was notified when
samples were routed to them. Persons who may have been
exposed to anthrax were informed by the on-scene incident
commander that results would be available within 48 h, that
antibiotics were not recommended pending test results, and
that they were free to consult with their medical provider. With
this protocol, only 50 (37.6%) of the biohazard calls yielded
items for testing by the state Bureau of Laboratories. All test
results from the laboratory were reported directly to State-
Comm, which then notified the on-scene incident commander
of the results. 
Laboratory Testing
The state public health laboratory in Boise is the only labo-
ratory in Idaho that accepts environmental samples for anthrax
testing. All 50 suspect exposure incidents, as determined by a
multiagency bridge call, were given numeric identifiers by
StateComm and linked to powder samples being routed to the
state public health laboratory. Transportation across Idaho was
facilitated by a state police escort to maintain the chain of cus-
tody. The state public health laboratory established an on-site
chain of custody protocol with local, state, or FBI law enforce-
ment officials before the microbiologic evaluation of any item.
Thirty incidents yielded postmarked items for testing (letters,
envelopes, and packages). Seven incidents yielded swabs or
vials of powder for testing. Miscellaneous objects received for
testing included clothing, a mailbox, a handheld vacuum, a
pillbox, a toy, a dollar bill, and a crate. Three of the letters con-
tained threats, which necessitated FBI involvement. Objects
with possible contamination were evaluated for spores with
the spore stain (Malachite green) by wet-mount-phase micros-
copy and were cultured for Bacillus anthracis under modified
biosafety level-3 conditions (2). Although some objects con-
tained Bacillus species, all were negative for B. anthracis by
gamma-phage testing. A turnaround time of 24 h or less was
generally maintained for presumptive determinations, and
StateComm was alerted immediately of presumptive negative
test results. A final culture-negative determination was made
48 h after receipt of the sample. Laboratorians followed proto-
cols provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion Laboratory Response Network. That the staff of three
microbiologists was not enough to handle the dramatic
increase in workload was soon evident. Therefore, 11 addi-
tional laboratorians were trained in test procedures, and the
staff was grouped into two-person teams to provide around-
the-clock coverage. Facility biosecurity was increased, with
locked entries, a sign-in desk, and guest badges.                                                                                                      
Health-Care Outreach
Idaho has documented rare, naturally occurring cases of
anthrax. The last human case of cutaneous anthrax occurred in
1964, and the last documented animal case occurred in a cow
in 1984. The state epidemiology staff developed two sets of
public health guidelines for health-care providers, which
included information about the epidemiology of naturally
occurring anthrax in Idaho, the features of the current outbreak
of anthrax (1,3,4), and the possible risk to postal workers. The
guidelines also included information about the availability of
in-state testing and state and local public health contacts.
These guidelines were faxed to the seven district health depart-
ments, which in turn faxed them to health-care providers,
emergency rooms, and infection control practitioners, follow-
ing the Health Alert Network system protocols. The guidelines
were also placed on the state health department Web site and
faxed or mailed to providers, media, and citizens who
requested anthrax information. 
During October 2001, local physicians contacted the state
epidemiology office for assistance in evaluating and treating
12 possible anthrax cases: 11 persons with possible inhala-
tional anthrax (6 [54.5%] were postal workers) and 1 person
with possible cutaneous anthrax. All human samples were
negative for anthrax. To better understand what syndromic
signs and symptoms created suspicion in health-care provid-
ers, we reviewed 9 of 12 suspected anthrax cases (Table).
Information was gathered and compared with the first 10 con-
firmed inhalational anthrax cases in the United States (5).
Occupational risk played a key role in suspicion of pulmonary
anthrax infection; however, the symptoms of the suspected
anthrax cases varied greatly from those of confirmed anthrax
cases. These findings were included in follow-up information
sent to health-care providers.
Discussion
Reviewing the problems encountered in Idaho and how
they were addressed may improve the public health response
Table. Clinical comparison of confirmed versus suspected inhalational 
anthrax cases
Characteristics
Confirmed casesa 
n=10 (%)
Idaho suspected cases, 
n=9b (%)
Postal worker or mail 
sorter
8 (80) 6/11c (54)
Fever/chills 10 (100) 2 (22)
Fatigue/malaise 10 (100) 8 (89)
Sweats 7 (70) 2 (22)
Cough 9 (90) 7 (78)
Nausea or vomiting 9 (90) 2 (22)
Dyspnea 8 (80) 3 (33) 
Rhinorrhea 1 (10) 4 (44)
aMultistate cases confirmed by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
bNine of the suspected inhalational cases had charts available for review. 
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in all states. A centralized communications center is critical
for reducing the impact of a large-scale outbreak on a public
health emergency response system and for providing timely
and consistent response to citizens. In Idaho, the preexisting
communications system enabled communication between
multiple agencies. The rapid development of triage protocols
is important for consistent response to a crisis. While basic
response protocols must be outlined for each event, a rapid
mechanism for protocol development and agreement by partic-
ipants must be part of any flexible response plan. Local health
departments should be included in biohazard response proto-
cols to minimize confusion during the management and fol-
low-up of each public health event. Initially, StateComm calls
included only state health department officials because local
health officials did not carry pagers. Local health officials in
Idaho are now equipped with pagers and are part of the
response protocol. Immediate reporting of laboratory test
results to a central communications center reduces the burden
on laboratory staff. The volume of callers seeking results was
decreased because health and law officials were aware that
results could be obtained from the communications center
directly. Extra effort and time attempting to reach first
responders, citizens, and health officials with test results were
eliminated in this manner. 
In responding to suspected bioterrorist events, treating
each event as a possible crime requires cooperation and plan-
ning. Transport of samples by law enforcement required coop-
eration with multiple county and state law enforcement
officials. Alternative transportation plans would have been
useful in Idaho should a local law enforcement agency have
refused to transport a specimen. In addition, the establishment
of a proper chain of custody and proper packaging procedures
would have allowed more streamlined processing of samples
for both laboratory safety and chain-of-custody requirements.
Education of state communications personnel in communica-
ble disease topics, such as anthrax, is required if communica-
tions personnel are used to initiate and coordinate response
protocols to biohazard events. A basic understanding of the
terminology and the general principles of epidemiologic
response would minimize the chance that a potentially serious
situation is overlooked. Trust between the decision-makers in
multiple local, state and federal agencies is essential for coor-
dinating responses effectively. In small states, fewer people are
usually involved in each response, and the same participants
tend to be on each call, simplifying coordination. Planning
meetings with other responding agencies are essential in order
to establish protocols and to foster trust.
States with small, rural populations often have fewer
resources to deal with the increasing stress on their emergency
response systems. Despite the lack of anthrax infections in the
western United States during the fall of 2001, citizens in Idaho
were fearful of being exposed to anthrax, and the public health
emergency response system was tested. A well-coordinated
response was required from agencies with little experience in
working together. Idaho was fortunate to have a statewide
communications network in place; however, even with this
response system, modifications were required to ensure
smooth relationships between first responders and public
health officials. 
Dr. Tengelsen is the deputy state epidemiologist at the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare. She is involved with bioterrorism
preparedness efforts in Idaho.
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